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Abstract: An industrial process includes many devices, variables and sub-processes that
are physically or electronically interconnected. These interconnections imply some level of
correlation between different process variables. Since most of the alarms in a process plant are
defined on process variables, alarms are also correlated. But this can be a nuisance to operators,
for one fault might trigger a, sometimes large, number of alarms. So, it is important to find
and correct correlated alarms. In this paper, we study different methods and techniques that
were proposed to measure correlation or similarity between alarms. The similarity indices are
first analytically calculated and then studied. The results are also validated using Monte Carlo
simulation.
Keywords: Alarm Management; Correlation Analysis; Similarity Measures; Pearson
Correlation Coefficient, Jaccard similarity Index.
1. INTRODUCTION
An industrial process often contains a large number of
devices, variables and control algorithms. In such process,
it is important to monitor the behavior of the system
to avoid damages, shutdowns, production loss, and safety
hazards. The most common method of process monitoring
is to define a safe or efficient range for each measured
variable, and if it exceeded the safe range, notify the
operator or other plant staff about the anomaly. The
alarm system is designed to perform this task (Hollifield
et al., 2010; Izadi et al., 2009). Once an alarm is activated,
the operator can take any necessary corrective action to
remedy the situation.
In an industrial process, there are many interconnections
between different variables, due to material, energy, or
information flow. These interconnections impose some cor-
relation between different process variables. In addition,
thanks to the advanced technologies and modern dis-
tributed control systems (DCS), almost all process vari-
ables in a plant are constantly measured (in fact, anything
that can be measured is measured). And for any variable
that is measured, alarms can be defined. These alarms
are known as process alarms. If two process variables are
connected and correlated, it is expected that their alarms
are also correlated, although with different intensity, de-
pending on the corresponding alarm limits. In any case,
correlation of alarms are widely reported and observed in
industry (Li et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2012;
Noda et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2019). There are other types
of alarms in a plant that are not associated to any process
variable. They are typically known as system alarms or
digital alarms. In this paper, however, we only focus on
process alarms as they count for the majority of alarms in
a plant.
Generally, in a plant, two types of data are generated,
and consequently two databases exist. One is process data
which is the measured value of different process variables.
The other one is alarm data which is the information
of alarms activated in the plant. Alarms are often text
messages that are displayed to the operator and include
some information about the time, place and severity of
the anomaly.
Although more measured variables provide a valuable
source of historical information and help operators and
engineers to better run their plant, more alarms only dis-
tract operators from their normal task. Excessive number
of alarms, many of which are correlated, is a problem
in today’s industry. During alarm rationalization, a pro-
cess of reviewing and redesigning the alarms in a plant,
many of these correlated alarms are eliminated (ANSI/ISA
Standard 18.2., 2009). For that purpose, finding correlated
alarms is a common task in monitoring alarm systems.
Different methods for correlation analysis in a process are
based on these two sets of data. Most of the methods
are, obviously, based on process data, because of the large
amount of information they carry. However, alarm correla-
tions are also important as they help to understand, main-
tain, improve or even redesign the alarm system. A few
methods to measure similarity between alarm sequences
have been introduced in the literature, including: Pearson
correlation of binary alarm sequences (Yang et al., 2010),
Jaccard similarity of binary alarm sequences (Kondaveeti
et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2013), Pearson correlation of
multivalued alarm sequences (Su et al., 2017), and Pearson
correlation of continuous-valued alarm sequences (Yang
et al., 2012).
In this paper, we try to answer several questions regarding
similarity of alarms: Can it be verified that if two process
variables are correlated, then so are their alarms? If the
answer is positive, which measure of similarity does better
preserve the correlation? Moreover, what is the role of the
alarm limit and how can it affect the alarm similarity. To
answer these questions, different methods of correlation
analysis of alarm data are mathematically studied. We first
review how alarm data is converted to sequences or time-
series which is more suitable for mathematical analysis.
Then we discuss different indices to measure similarity
between alarm sequences which includes an analytical
derivation of different similarity measure. A Monte-Carlo
simulation is presented to validate the analytical deriva-
tions, as well as to compare different similarity measures.
2. ALARM DATA
Alarm is a notification to the operator about an anomaly
in the system. Alarms are almost always a text message
displayed to the operator, along with other audio and/or
visual signs. An alarm message contains some information
about the abnormality, including associated process vari-
able or tag, time of occurrence, alarm or tag description,
priority, and value. This information, in addition to being
displayed to the operator, is also stored either in flat files
or in a relational database.
There are three different entities that should be distin-
guished:
• Process variables (PV): In modern process indus-
try, each process variable (for instance the level of a
vessel) is continuously measured by the distributed
control system (DCS). The time-stamped measure-
ments are known as process data and are available
from databases. The process data is a discrete time-
series and shows the trend of each variable over time.
• Individual alarm (IA) tags: Alarms are often
triggered if a PV exceeds its predefined limits. For
each PV many different alarms can be defined. For
instance, when a PV is higher than a certain limit, a
high (HI) alarm is activated. If it continues to rise and
passes another higher limit, a highhigh (HH) alarm
is triggered. Similarly a PV might have low (LO) or
lowlow (LL) alarms. Some DCS brands allow up to 16
different alarms to be defined for each PV. Each one
of these alarms is referred to as an individual alarm
(IA) tag. Therefore, each PV can have multiple IA
tags. On average, in an normal size plant, the number
of IA tags is about 3-5 times the number of PVs.
• Collective alarm (CA) tags: As discussed, multi-
ple IA tags can be associated with one single PV. We
can collect all the IA tags that are associated with
a PV under one single tag. We refer to this tag as a
collective alarm (CA) tag. In this study we assume
that there are only four IA tags for each PV, namely:
LL, LO, HI, HH. Therefore, each CA tag for a certain
PV contains four IA tags related to that PV.
In a plant, correlation analysis and similarity measures can
be performed on each set of the aforementioned entities.
In this study, we focus on similarity measures between
alarm tags (IA or CA) and their relationship to their
corresponding PVs.
3. PREPARATION OF ALARM DATA
As previously mentioned, due to their nature (a time-
stamped message) alarm data (individual or collective
tags) cannot be directly used for mathematical analysis.
So, we first need to convert this data to a form, often a
time-series, suitable for calculations. For this purpose, a
few methods are available in the literature that convert
alarm data to: binary (Noda et al., 2011; Nishiguchi
et al., 2010; Higuchi et al., 2009; Kondaveeti et al., 2010),
multivalued (Su et al., 2017) or continuous-valued (Yang
et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2015) sequences. In this paper we are
interested in the first two methods, which will be reviewed
in this section.
Notice that the time scale of the obtained time-series
is based on the sampling time of the process and the
resolution of alarm time-stamps. In process industry, PVs
are often sampled every second, but the exact value
depends on the individual plant.
3.1 Binary alarm sequence
For each IA tag, i.e., IAi, we can assign a binary sequence
si(l) of ones and zeros, where l denotes the sampling
instance. If the alarm is active for this individual tag at
time l then si(l) = 1 and otherwise si(l) = 0.
Binary sequences can similarly be defined for CA tags. So,
for each CA tag, CAi, the binary sequence si(l) is defined
such that, si(l) = 1 if at least one of the IA tags that
compose the CA tag is active. Otherwise, i.e., when all
the IA tags within the CA tag are inactive, si(l) = 0.
Therefore, the binary sequence of an alarm tag (IA or CA)
is constructed as
si(l) =
{
1 if alarm is active at l
0 otherwise
(1)
There are two technical issues here that need to be
discussed: point-based vs. interval-based data; and raw vs.
padded data.
Point-based vs. interval-based data An alarm is a mes-
sage generated at one instant of time. So for each alarm
message there is only one time-stamp. On the other hand,
in many DCS brands, once a process variable returns to
the normal state (within the predefined limits), another
message, known as the RTN (return-to-normal) is gener-
ated and stored in the database. If the RTN message is
available, then we know when the alarm state is over. In
this case, alarm duration can be defined from the time of
the alarm message to the time of the RTN message. Hence,
we have two types of alarm data; point-based (i.e., only the
alarm messages are available) and interval-based (both the
alarm and RTN messages are available) (Mannani et al.,
2019).
The difference is significant when a binary sequence is
constructed. For point-based data, 1’s appear only at
time instants of the alarm messages. So the 1’s are very
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Fig. 1. Binary alarm sequences for four IA tags
sparse which makes similarity analysis rather difficult.
However, for interval-based data, 1’s appear for the alarm
duration, and there are many more 1’s for each single
alarm sequence. Therefore, similarity analysis is more
conclusive and meaningful.
Raw vs. padded data If only point-based data is avail-
able, or if for some reason it is decided to discard RTN
messages, then the binary sequences should be enriched
with more 1’s so that similarity methods can be used. This
is known as padding. For this purpose a number of 1’s are
added before and after each alarm sample (Kondaveeti
et al., 2010). In this case, for each 1 in the raw alarm
sequence, r samples before and after are populated with
1’s as well. The selection of r depends on the individ-
ual PV and the DCS configuration, and requires better
understanding of the process. r is an indication of how
long an average alarm might last for a PV. For a fast
PV, e.g., pressure or flow, a smaller r is preferred. But
for slower variables such as temperature and level, larger
r might show better results. An acceptable initial guess
could be selected based on the ANSI/ISA Standard 18.2.
(2009) recommendations for delay-timers, i.e., 60 seconds
for temperature and level variables and 15 seconds for flow
and pressure tags, or a fraction of thereof.
Even if interval-based data is available, padding might still
be useful. It helps better analysis by further enrichment of
data. Padding is also useful when there are different time
lags between different PVs, which is prevalent in processes.
As an example, consider the two binary alarm sequences:
s1: 01000100100000100
s2: 00100010001000010
By visual inspection, it seems that there is some correla-
tion between the two sequences. But because the alarms
in the second sequence are lagged by a sample or two
compared to the first one, the calculated correlation might
not be high. But after padding there are more matched 1’s
and the correlation will be higher.
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Fig. 2. Binary alarm sequence (top) and multivalued alarm
sequence (bottom) for a CA tag
3.2 Multivalued alarm sequence
This method is proposed only for CA tags and is not
applicable to IA tags. As previously mentioned, each CA
tag is a collection of four IA tags, LL, LO, HI, HH, for a
PV. So, an alarm could be due to the PV exceeding any
of the four limits. Now, we can define a multivalued time
sequence as
si(l) =


2 if HH alarm is active
1 if HI alarm is active
0 if no alarm is active
−1 if LO alarm is active
−2 if LL alarm is active
(2)
This sequence, collects the information of all the alarm
tags related to one PV (Su et al., 2017). Notice that, it
is assumed that at each sampling instant, only one of the
alarms can be activated (e.g., once the HH alarm is trig-
gered, the HI alarm will be cleared). This is demonstrated
in Fig. 1.
A multivalued sequence, compared to a binary sequence,
carries more information regarding the behavior of a PV.
A binary sequence indicates only if an alarm is active or
not. But a multivalued sequence, in addition to that, shows
which individual alarm is active.
For an example, consider the four IA tags for a PV. The
binary sequences for each of these 4 individual alarms are
depicted in Fig. 1. If we combine these 4 IA tags into a CA
tag, then we can construct the binary sequence of this CA
tag as illustrated in Fig. 2 (top). The multivalued alarm
sequence for this CA tag is also shown in Fig. 2 (bottom).
4. SIMILARITY MEASURES
After the alarm sequence (binary, multivalued) is pre-
pared, the similarity between two alarm sequences are
calculated. Depending on the definition of the sequence,
different similarity measures can be used. For binary se-
quences, binary similarity measures, specifically the Jac-
card index (Kondaveeti et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2013),
or the Pearson correlation coefficient (Yang et al., 2010)
have been used. Pearson correlation coefficient, has been
suggested for multivalued alarm sequences (Su et al., 2017)
as well.
Before the methods to calculate similarity are discussed,
it should be mentioned that for better similarity analysis
a time lag is preferably considered. The reason is that,
the similarity between two PVs or alarm sequences is
not necessarily observed at the same time. A PV might
follow the variations of another one with some delay.
This is also true for alarm sequences. For instance if the
fuel feed of a furnace that heats a vessel increases, the
temperature of the vessel should increase as well. But
this happens after some time lag. If this time-lag is not
considered in similarity calculations, the result might not
show correct correlation between these two PVs. However,
in the following analytical derivations, for simplicity we
do not consider time-lags. All the calculations remain
valid in case a time-lag between the sequences exists, by
considering a shifted sequence.
To calculate the similarity measures of two alarm se-
quences, we assume that underlying process variables fol-
low a Gaussian distribution. Also we need to define F and
F2d to compute probabilities related to a Gaussian random
variable:
F (x, y) =
{
1√
2pi
∫ y
x
e(−
u2
2 )du, y ≥ x
0, otherwise
F2d(xa, xb, ya, yb, ρ) =
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2
∫ xb
xa
∫ yb
ya
e
(−u
2+v2−2ρuv
2(1−ρ2)
)
dudv
(3)
This assumption of Gaussian distribution is for the sake
of brevity here, and the process variables can follow any
distribution. The only difference is in the definition of F
and F2d functions above.
In the following sections, different methods to calculate
similarity between alarm sequences, are discussed and
calculated.
5. PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Pearson correlation coefficient is the most common method
to calculate correlation between two variables. It can
be used for all alarm sequences as well (Yang et al.,
2010). This applies to all types of binary, multivalued, and
continuous-valued alarm sequences.
For two random variables x and y, the Pearson correlation
coefficient is calculated as
ρx,y =
cov(x, y)
σxσy
=
E[xy]− µxµy
σxσy
(4)
where µz, and σz are the mean and the standard deviations
of z, respectively.
Let Xi ∼ N(µi, σi) and Xj ∼ N(µj , σj) be two correlated
PVs with Gaussian distribution and Pearson correlation
coefficient ρ (i.e., every sample of Xi is correlated with its
concurrent sample of Xj with coefficient ρ and indepen-
dent form other samples).
5.1 Binary alarm sequences
Assume that there are two high alarm limits configured
for these two PVs with thresholds set at hi and hj . Let Bi
and Bj be the two corresponding binary alarm sequences.
The question we try to answer here is: what is the Pearson
correlation coefficient of Bi and Bj?
It is a well known fact that Bi has a Bernoulli distribution,
which takes the value 1 with probability Pr(Xi > hi) and
the value 0 with probability 1−Pr(Xi > hi). Therefor, the
mean and standard deviations of Bi can be calculated as
µBi = E[Bi] = Pr(Bi = 1)× 1 + Pr(Bi = 0)× 0
= Pr(Xi > hi) = F (
hi − µi
σi
,+∞)
σ2Bi = E[Bi
2]− E[Bi]
2 = Pr(Xi > hi)− Pr(Xi > hi)
2
= Pr(Xi > hi)(1 − Pr(Xi > hi))
= F (
hi − µi
σi
,+∞)(1− F (
hi − µi
σi
,+∞))
Therefore, the Pearson correlation coefficient of Bi and Bj
can be calculated as
ρBi,Bj =
1
σBiσBj
[
Pr(Xi > hi, Xj > hj)− µBiµBj
]
=
1
σBiσBj
×

F2d(
hi−µi
σi
,+∞,
hj−µj
σj
,+∞, ρ)− µBiµBj ρ 6= 1
F (
max(hi,hj)−µi
σi
,+∞)− µBiµBj ρ = 1
5.2 Multivalued alarm sequence
Now, assume that for alarms, namely highhigh, high,
low, lowlow, are configured for the PVs Xi and Xj.
The corresponding threshold are hhi, hi, li, lli for Xi,
and similarly for Xj . With this alarm configuration, two
multivalued alarm sequences Mi and Mj are obtained. It
can be easily verified that
Mi = 2Bhhi +Bhi −Bli − 2Blli (5)
where, for instance Bhhi is the corresponding binary
sequence for the HH alarm. The other binary sequences
are defined similarly.
The mean µMi and standard deviation σMi of Mi can be
calculated from
µMi = E[Mi] =
2∑
r=−2
r F (Sr,i, Sr+1,i)
σ2Mi = E[Mi
2]− E[Mi]
2
=
2∑
r=−2
r2 F (Sr,i, Sr+1,i)−
(
2∑
r=−2
r F (Sr,i, Sr+1,i)
)2
where Sr,i is defined as
Sr,i =


+∞ r=3
hhi−µi
σi
r=2
hi−µi
σi
r=1
li−µi
σi
r=0
lli−µi
σi
r=-1
−∞ r=-2
(6)
ρMi,Mj =
1
σMiσMj
[
E[MiMj ]− µMiµMj
]
=
1
σMiσMj
×

2∑
r=−2
2∑
t=−2
rtF2d(Sr,i,Sr+1,i,St,j ,St+1,j,ρ)−µMiµMj ρ 6= 1
2∑
r=−2
2∑
t=−2
rtF
(
max(Sr,iSt,j),
min(Sr+1,i,St+1,j)
)
−µMiµMj
ρ = 1
6. BINARY SIMILARITY MEASURES
These types of similarity measures can only be used for
binary alarm sequences. There are many different indices
to measure the similarity between two binary sequences
(Yang et al., 2013). In fact, 76 different indices are reported
in Choi et al. (2010). One thing that needs to be decided
beforehand is whether ‘0’s are as important as 1’s in
similarity. Some methods suggest that they both should
be given the same importance, but others only emphasize
on 1’s. In the context of alarm data, a zero in the binary
sequence means no alarm, which does not provide the
operator with any new information. So, for alarm data,
indices that are based on matching 1’s only are preferred.
An index in this category, which has previously used for
binary alarm sequences (Kondaveeti et al., 2010), is the
Jaccard index.
6.1 Definition of the Jaccard Index
For two binary sequences si and sj , the Jaccard similarity
index is calculated as
Sjac(si, sj) =
ai,j
ai,j + bi,j + ci,j
(7)
Here, ai,j is the number of matching 1’s (i.e., the total
number of times where both si and sj are 1), bi,j is the
number of times where si is 1 and sj is 0, and ci,j is the
number of times where si is 0 and sj is 1 (hence, bi,j + ci,j
represent the total number of mismatches). The Jaccard
similarity index is a number in [0, 1].
6.2 Analytical Derivations
To calculate the Jaccard similarity index between two
binary alarm sequences, we can use the equivalent concept
of probabilistic interpolation of sets of instances. The
Jaccard similarity index can then be rewritten as
Sjac(si, sj) =
Pr({Xi > hi} ∩ {Xj > hj})
Pr({Xi > hi} ∪ {Xj > hj})
=
Pr(Xi > hi, Xj > hj)
1− Pr(Xi < hi, Xj < hj)
(8)
Therefore, the analytical value of the Jaccard similarity
index is
Sjac(si, sj) =


F2d(
hi−µi
σi
,+∞,hj−µj
σj
,+∞,ρ)
1−F2d(−∞,
hi−µi
σi
,−∞,hj−µj
σj
,ρ)
ρ 6= 1
F (
max(hi,hj )−µi
σi
,+∞)
F (
min(hi,hj )−µi
σi
,+∞)
ρ = 1
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Fig. 3. Correlation color map of the original process
variables
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Fig. 4. Correlation color map obtained from binary alarm
sequences
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Fig. 5. Correlation color map obtained from multivalued
alarm sequences
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Fig. 6. The Jaccard similarity color map obtained from
binary alarm sequences
7. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
In the previous sections, different measures of similarity
between two alarm sequences were discussed. To study how
different models of alarm data (binary and multivalued)
and various similarity measures are compared, a Monte
Carlo simulation is carried out. For the case study, 15
different correlated PVs with Gaussian distribution but
different parameters (mean and variance) are generated.
Also, different values for the pair-wise correlation of these
random variables are selected. Fig. 3 shows the correlation
color map (CCM) of the original process variables. for
validation of the obtained analytical results, the CCM
based on analytical calculations (which here is only the
correlation initially selected) and that obtained from sim-
ulation are depicted.
To compare different models of alarm data, high alarm
limits are considered for all these variables and their corre-
sponding binary alarm sequences are obtained. The Pear-
son correlation coefficient as well as the Jaccard similarity
index for these 15 binary alarm sequences are then calcu-
lated. Then, for each PV, 4 alarm limits (HH, HI, LO, LL)
are considered and the corresponding multivalued alarm
sequence are acquired. Subsequently, the Pearson Corre-
lation coefficient of these multivalued alarm sequences are
calculated. The results for each case (both analytical and
Monte Carlo simulation) are reported graphically using
CCM: Pearson correlation coefficient for binary alarm
sequences in Fig. 4; Pearson correlation coefficient for
multivalued alarm sequences in Fig. 5; and the Jaccard
similarity index for binary alarm sequences in Fig. 6. Since
there are 15 variables, CCM is a 15× 15 matrix.
From the figures, it can be observed that, for each case the
analytical and simulation based CCMs are identical. This
validates the formulations obtained for different similarity
indices.
Moreover, it is expected that similarity of two alarm
variables should, more or less, be proportional to the
correlation of the two corresponding PVs. So, it is expected
that CCMs based on alarm variables look similar to that
of PVs. This can also be observed from the figures, albeit
with different levels of likeness. As it can be seen, the
CCM obtained from multivalued alarm sequences is the
most similar to the one obtained from the PVs. The
other two (based on binary alarm sequences) are not
as similar to the CCM of PVs, with the one obtained
from Pearson correlation coefficient more similar than
that of the Jaccard similarity index. The reason is that
multivalued alarm sequences are richer and carry more
information compared to the other two alarm sequences.
The mere fact that different alarm types (LL, LO, HI,
HH) are treated differently in this sequence, significantly
improves the correlations.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied and compared different methods
of similarity analysis of alarms. The differences among
the methods are in two aspects. One is how the alarm
sequences are constructed. The two common models dis-
cussed are binary, and multivalued alarm sequences. They
are all obtained from the original alarm messages. Based
on the application and the data available, one might use
point-based or interval- based data, or decide to pad the
sequence. The second difference is in the method used for
calculating similarity. The two techniques that are widely
adopted are the Jaccard similarity index which could be
applied to binary sequences only, and the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient which is applicable to all sequences. For
each case, the similarity measure is analytically calculated
and verified through Monte Carlo simulation.
The analytical results and Monte Carlo simulations con-
firm the intuitive result that if two variables are correlated,
their alarms are correlated too. Moreover, alarm sequences
can be created based on individual alarm tags or combined
alarm tags of one PV (e.g., for multivalued case). The
latter carries more information and is expected to yield
better correlation. This is confirmed by simulation too.
This means that if it is intended for the correlation of
alarms to be similar to the correlation of the underlying
PVs, then Pearson correlation coefficient of multivalued
alar sequences is the best choice.
The analytical study carried out in this paper on alarm
similarity measures, can be further used to answer a
number of questions regarding analysis and design of alarm
systems. Some of these topics are:
• If two PVs are highly correlated, then their corre-
sponding alarms are highly correlated as well. In this
case, is it meaning full to configure alarms on both
of them? Notice that, on of the deficiencies of alarm
systems that is often tried to avoid is related (i.e.,
correlated) alarms, as they are generally regarded as
nuisance to the operator. If the alarms are to be
configured on both PVs, how can we design the alarm
limits to make the alarm correlation smaller?
• If two or more alarms are configured for one single PV
(e.g., HH, HI, LO, LL) how the alarm limit should be
selected to make the alarms more informative? If, for
instance HH and HI alarm limits are selected close
to each other, then the HH and HI alarms are highly
correlated, which again renders them related and not
acceptable.
• How different alarm configuration techniques, such as
delay-timers or filters, impact alarm correlation?
These questions are subject of the current studies and will
be discussed elsewhere.
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